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I am going to make the assumption –following advice- that you already know something about
the way in which we organise electricity, first of all, in Europe, more widely and, secondly, in
Britain, more particularly.  My specialisation is much more in the economics and regulation of
the British, or putting it more precisely and specifically, the English and Welsh electricity
industry.  We have a separate industry in Scotland and a completely separate one in Northern
Ireland.  I am going to talk a bit about current developments and problems of regulation in, first
and briefly, European electricity and then, in somewhat more detail, the England and Wales
electricity model.
I. THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPERIENCE
I.1 EUROPE-WIDE DIRECTIVES FOR ELECTRICITY DEVELOPMENT AND SUBSIDIARITY APPROACH
FOR REGULATION
We have passed, within the European Union, for the first time, a significant directive affecting
the way in which electricity markets will develop in Europe, more generally.  It is the Electricity
Directive called 96/92.  It attempts, in some ways, to be a comprehensive directive.  It covers the
generation of electricity, it covers transmission access, in some ways the most important issue – I
think – and it covers, perhaps with more publicity, the issue of the retail sale of electricity.
In regulatory terms, the fundamental issue seems to me to be that there has, of political necessity
within Europe, been an agreement that the regulation of this directive will have to be a matter,
almost exclusively, for national governments.  We have in Europe now a political principle we
know as subsidiarity. It is a principle which simply says one should devolve, to the lowest level
of political structure as possible, responsibility for implementing policies.  There is an increasing
resistance on the part of much of the public within Europe to supranational power, to
international regulation and politics.  A response of those in the political system who want to
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continue with Europe-wide developments has been to try,  wherever possible, to devolve, first of
all to national governments, and then where it seems appropriate, to regional or even local
governments, responsibility for the regulation and implementation of policies of all kinds.
The problem that we have in the field of electricity is that the directive prescribes common rules
for the whole of Europe, but the regulation of that directive is going to be almost exclusively a
matter for the national administrations and the national regulatory agencies,  and one’s suspicion
is that this will make for a very uneven form of regulation with particular results.
I.2 A MIXED PRIVATE-PUBLIC FORMULA FOR GENERATION
Just let me outline very briefly what this Electricity Directive does.  It has been implemented in
all fifteen member states of the European Union, starting in February of this year with two
exceptions, one of which is Greece, who have had a two-year period in which to adapt -the year
2001.  Most of its provisions have to be implemented by the year 2003 and let me say briefly
what they cover.
In the area, first of all, of generation, there is a possibility that when new generating capacity may
be needed, member states are given two alternatives.  They can take the relatively more liberal
markets, that of licensing new generation. The intention there is that anybody who chooses to
build new generation will have the freedom to do so, subject only to whatever the national
licensing requirements may be, but these are meant to be technical and, in economic terms –
relatively speaking- trivial requirements.  But there is also another option -a feature of this
electricity directive is that, at all points, it gives member states options.
The other option is then, a process of tendering whereby a continuing, often State monopoly
utility, will make a decision about what new capacity is required, but it will no longer be a case
that that utility will have an automatic right to own and construct that generation facility.  It will
need to conduct a tendering process of a relatively public and transparent kind in which the
successful bidder will, in some public process, show that they can offer at the lowest possible
price, the specified new capacity. This allows very considerable planning powers of a traditional
kind to rest in the hands of a central, and probably State-owned utility.  It allows the planning of
generation to be a centralised matter, but the detailed implementation and cost minimisation
aspects, will then be subject to a tendering process.  So in that sense, it is not a very large
liberalisation and not very much publicity has attended the generation part of the directive.
I.3 CHOICES ON THIRD-PARTY ACCESS TO NETWORKS
The second part of Electricity Directive 96/92 consists of access to transmission, and for that
matter distribution, and it deals with the terms on which third-party access will be allowed to the
network system.  Here member states are being given three particular kinds of choices.  There
can be what is called regulated access, negotiated access or something called the single buyer.  It
has taken a total of about seven years to get member states to agree to this.7
Most of the argument has been around the idea of the single buyer which was an idea invented by
Electricité de France (EDF) around 1991, on which they spent about five years fighting for very
strongly and then decided to abandon.  We have had an enormous battle over allowing for the
possibility of the single-buyer model of transmission access.  Now, every single member state in
the European Union has said they do not wish to use the single-buyer model.  They will use either
regulated or negotiated access, which I think is a good thing because the single-buyer model is,
by some long distance, the least liberal way of allowing people access onto the system.  In the
single-buyer model, a single, dominant national utility, will be responsible for procuring all
generation and then selling it on to all final customers or at least, if not all final customers,
certainly all small customers. There will be some provision –as we shall see later on- for large
customers to have freedom of access.  In practice, the issue for individual member states has been
whether to apply the idea of regulated access or negotiated access.
Again, regulated access is the more liberal solution where you, in principle, allow anybody access
to the transmission and distribution network on some terms that are common and agreed to apply
to everybody. Or the less liberal approach of negotiated access, where everybody who wishes to
have access to the transmission system must engage in a more or less private negotiation with the
owner of the transmission network.  It thus becomes extremely easy, in principle –certainly in
practice, if not in principle- in negotiated access, for the owner of the transmission network to
declare there is some insuperable technical problem -most likely it is going to be claimed to be
congestion in the system- which will not allow people to get access when the owner of the
transmission network decides, for some other market-based reason,  that they do not wish other
parties to have access.
At the moment, most of the member states within the EU are choosing between regulated and
negotiated access. Greece has not yet decided. It thinks it might go for the single buyer but as it
would be the only EU member country to do so, the chances of that seem to me to be relatively
small.  A majority of countries have in fact chosen regulated access, the more liberal solution.
The French and others are choosing negotiated access.
I.4 FREEDOM TO CHOOSE A RETAILER
The third element of Electricity Directive 96/92 is the question of the retail supply of electricity.
This has also had quite a lot of publicity as well.  There is, in this respect, a common requirement
across all the member states. The exact figures do not matter, but by the year 2003,
approximately speaking, 33% of all retail sales of electricity, that is, the consumers with the
largest amount,  constituting roughly a third of the entire market, will have freedom to choose
their supplier from anybody that will sell them electricity within the EU.  The proportions will
rise gradually and end up at 33%.
It was thought, at first, that some of the countries which have had more traditional, vertically-
integrated structures would have difficulty in meeting this target of 33% by the year 2003.
Anyhow, our early experience is that most countries, including those that seemed the least liberal
in the first instance, will probably exceed this target and some may reach 50%.  There are some8
countries within the EU – of which the UK is one – which have already reached the position of
100%.  In fact, we have reached it this year; so some countries will already more than meet the
requirements.
I.5 ENVISAGED SHORTCOMINGS OF ELECTRICITY REFORM
The regulatory problem that I think is most dominant in this development is the following: if you
take a step back from the economics of regulation, and ask questions about what are the politics
of electricity reform in the European Union.  The politics of electricity reform are fundamentally
driven by the requirements of large European industrial consumers and, within the field of large
European industrial consumers, it is German industry, in particular, which has been the political
leader.  That is perhaps for two reasons: one is that German industry is, in any case, the dominant
industry within the European Union.  But secondly, and more importantly, German retail
electricity tariffs are by some distance the highest in the whole of the EU.  German industry feels
itself to have been suffering very substantially in recent years, especially because of the need to
absorb within the German economy, the relatively inefficient industry from the old GDR -
German Democratic or East German Republic.  German industry has been looking for all the
possible advantages that it can get, has made alliances with other kinds of European industry and
is very much being the driving force behind the directive.
My main worry from a regulatory perspective is the following: that the new generation system
actually will not make a lot of difference.  On the whole, in Europe, we still have surplus capacity
in electricity industries, where we have not done very radical reform and there is not a very
strong impulse to new investment; consequently, whatever happens here will not make a great
deal of difference.
In the area of transmission, I think, it is very likely that the dominant incumbent utilities which
are not yet much reformed  -and I think Electricité de France (EDF) is the principal industry in
this respect-  will apply the principle of negotiated access and will make negotiations involve
extremely high transaction costs, over extremely long periods of time, and it will be very difficult
for people to get the kind of open access to the transmission system that they would wish.
Moreover, because the prime regulatory authority for this will be the French Ministry of Industry
-not the European Commission- the chances of the French regulatory system seriously
intervening and preventing this kind of potential delay, seems to me to be quite slow.  It means
that the pace of genuine change will vary very much by Nation–State and, I suspect, in the case
of France –Greece will probably be another one as well- it will be very slow.
Turning to the third issue –and that is the opening up of roughly one third of the market to
competition- the main worry here, I think, is that those utilities, like EDF,  which are worried
about losing their market share,  have already been engaged in a process of making some
extremely attractive offers to French large industrial consumers, at very low and very attractive
tariff rates, on relatively long terms, with some possibility of flexibility in price in later years,
precisely designed to make sure that although, in principle,  French industrial consumers will be
able to choose their electricity supplier quite freely, in practice, they will remain with EDF.  They
will be very happy, they will get very low tariffs and will get better terms than they would have9
done before.  The result for these industrial consumers will be quite good, but because utilities
like EDF will remain dominant in the French market, there is an extremely strong prospect of
quite a large cross-subsidy taking place.  So that in this particular case, French small consumers,
mostly household consumers but also smaller industrial and commercial consumers as well,  are
likely to have loaded onto their market, relatively high costs to finance the way in which EDF
will drive off foreign competition in this 33% of the market which is open to competition.  There
is no way in which the European regulatory system will be able to do very much about that if the
national governments and national regulatory systems choose not to intervene themselves.
There is therefore, I think, a very strong chance -given the initial politics, which was the whole
reform,  fundamentally motivated politically by the needs of large industrial customers- that the
large industrial customers will almost certainly end up significantly better off, irrespective of who
actually supplies them. Certainly, for some countries, there is a real risk of an increased level of
cross-subsidy, very much at the expense of household and small consumers, and very much to the
advantage of industrial consumers.
I.6 IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUPRANATIONAL CORRECTIVE REGULATORY ACTION
People ask:  is there no kind of Europe-wide level of regulation that might correct for
contradictions or abuses or difficulties of this kind?  And the answer is: not to any very large
extent.  The only kind of serious regulatory agency for European directives of this kind is the
Commission of the European Community.  The problem for the European Commission is that it
is –politically speaking- going through very difficult times.  The possibility of the European
Commission acting as an effective regulatory agency, and contradicting the interests of individual
member states within the European Union is –I would say- historically, at the moment, at an all-
time low level.
So while it is true, that certain directorates-general of the European Commission, for example,
Directorate-General Four, which is responsible for competition policy, Directorate-General 17
which is responsible for energy policy, and the detailed implementation of this directive, while
they both in principle have powers which allow them to intervene in some way,  should there be
significant abuses that result from this new directive, in practice, the chances of them being able
to do so, in a politically likely way, are actually very small.  So we have a major regulatory
vacuum, a hole at the heart of the European enterprise in electricity.  Nobody has thought about it
very much yet, because this is the very first time that within the European Market as a whole, we
have tried to apply common rules.  We have had, until now, energy and electricity policy,
devolved entirely as a member state responsibility, and this is the very first time that serious
market rules are to be implemented across all member states.  It is at the moment politically
virtually impossible to think about supranational regulation to enforce it and so my fear about
this, as an issue, is that industrial consumers will benefit very greatly but that will not be as a
consequence of much greater efficiency.   It will be mainly at the expense of smaller, especially
household, consumers.10
II. THEUNITED KINGDOM EXPERIENCE
II.1 MORE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM DOWNWARD TRENDS IN PRIMARY FUEL PRICES RATHER
THAN FROM EFFICIENCY GAINS
One of the things where we have been very, very lucky in England is that we have done our
privatisation at a time when world fossil fuel prices were falling very sharply.  The largest single
element of cost in our electricity industry, is the price of primary fuel, initially, coal and now,
particularly gas.  The price of both of these things has fallen continuously all through the 1990s.
This has meant there has been a lot of economic rent that could be thrown around quite easily.
We have been able to allow shareholders to make very large gains, while still reducing final
consumer tariffs.  Now, that has partly been, because the industry is more efficient.  The
dominant explanation for the ability to both pay shareholders much more money and to give
consumers lower tariffs has been a very large amount of headroom opened up by these much
lower fossil fuel prices.
Partly for that reason, domestic tariffs are still falling.  We find that the regulator, despite the
opening up of the small consumer market, is still price-regulating this market, at least until the
year 2000.  He is currently consulting about whether to continue to price-regulate this apparently
open market well beyond the year 2000.  I think, since he is worried about poorer consumers
being charged more, almost certainly, he will do so.  The regulator has already stated that, on
average, the host distribution company must reduce its tariffs to all consumers by a minimum of
9% over two years, 1998 to the year 2000,  which is relatively easy to achieve because there are
price controls on transmission and distribution which require transmission and distribution
charges to come down.  Moreover, he already knows the details of some contracts signed for
generation, in which the generation price is coming down as well.  What makes it a sweeter pill
for people to swallow is that every consumer will, at least, have a 9% reduction in tariffs for two
years, even if they do not switch supplier.  That is what might make it a politically much easier
problem than it otherwise would be.
It is important to mention that part of the relative success of our experiment in Britain is that it
has been largely financed by low coal and gas prices.  If coal and gas prices had risen to the same
extent that they had fallen, and at the same time we had privatised, we would have had a very
much more political solution.  We have been able to allow economic efficiency as our primary
regulatory criterion because the underlying economic force was declining fossil fuel prices,
which meant that the amount of available economic rent was actually rising very fast.  That has
been a way of lubricating the entire process.
Summing up, in general, consumers have benefited quite a lot since privatisation.  If you ask how
much of it is due to falling fossil fuel prices, or to effective regulation, or to competitive forces
and efficiency, I have to answer you, number one cause, is falling fossil fuel prices;  number two
cause, is better regulation, reducing these prices; and number three cause, is better internal
efficiency as a result of competition.  That does not mean –I think- that internal efficiency as a
result of competition is not important.  I think it is, and it has mattered.  But it has not been a11
dramatic change.  There has not been an enormous change in efficiency since 1990, certainly not
nearly enough to bring about the tariff reductions that we have actually had.  It so happens that
we have had falling fossil fuel prices, improved regulatory control of monopoly price areas, and
some improvements through efficiency and competition as well.  But the above is the order in
which, quantitatively, these benefits have been delivered to final consumers.
II.2 RE-SETTING CAPS TO DEAL WITH MISLEADING INFORMATION IN TRANSMISSION
The transmission system –when we privatised our industry- was fairly comprehensive and
slightly larger than we needed, so the scale of investment requirements in transmission, by
comparison with countries like Argentina, is actually very small.  Nevertheless, it is not trivial,
and part of the transmission system is quite old –it is about 30 years old- and it needs replacement
and substantial repair, such as to constitute essentially new investment.  The way in which we
handle investment is through price regulation.  We have the rpi – x system. In 1990,  the value of
“x” was equal to zero, in other words, transmission charges could rise at the same rate as prices in
general.  In 1993, it was set at three.  In a single year, in 1997, it was set at 20.  At one moment in
1997, transmission charges had to fall, or transmission revenues, to be strictly accurate, had to
fall by 20%, and then every year, to the year 2001, they will have to fall by another 4% which
means that by the year 2001,  transmission charges will only be 55%, in real terms, of what they
were in 1990.
When it comes to resetting the “x”  term in prices, the regulator invites the transmission company
to estimate both in physical and financial terms, what investment requirements  will be over the
regulated period.  He then says, “I will allow you a real rate of return on this investment”.  One of
the reasons why price-cap regulation in the end is actually quite a close relative of rate of return
regulation is that, whenever you get into an issue of investment, you cannot avoid rate of return
questions.  So we have said, 7% is the allowed real rate of return on new transmission or
distribution low-risk investment.  Essentially what happens is, when the price formula is
determined, part of that determination is the regulator’s view of the amount of necessary
investment which is always less than the company says –it is part of the bargaining game
between the two sides-, on which he then allows them a 7% annual rate of return and that is, in
fact,  the way in which the price-cap is determined, together with the consideration of operating
costs and other revenues and costs.
The interesting story here –briefly- is that in this first resetting in 1993, the National Grid
Company -the private company- said “we are going to have to do an enormous amount of
investment in the next four years”. Although the regulator did not completely believe them, he
believed them about 85%.  He gave them a price control of three. They went away and said, that
is absolutely great, and they made an enormous amount of money.  They came back in 1996 and
said, “we are going to have to do an enormous amount of investment in the next five years”.  The
regulator said, “I do not believe you at all.  I am only going to allow you 10% of what you say
you need and, to punish you for fooling me last time, I am going to make you reduce your prices
by 20% overnight”. Interestingly enough, if they had disliked this so much that they thought it
was unfair, they could have appealed to our Monopolies and Mergers Commission, which acts as
a Court of Appeal, so they do have some recourse.  Of course, in practice, the electricity regulator12
had been in touch with the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and they said exactly what they
intended to do.  Although the National Grid Company could have made that appeal, and although
it might have been successful, it actually calculated that, in practice, it would not be.
The 10% reduction was once and then, each subsequent year, there was going to have to be a
further 4% reduction, each year until the year 2001.  So the result was that, by the year 2001, the
average level of transmission charge could only be 55% of what it was in 1990.  In other words, it
had almost halved.  That does not actually suggest that there has been a doubling of productivity
or efficiency in the industry.  It actually suggests there is a lot of excess profit that was being
made earlier on and has now been taken away.  There has been improvement in efficiency and
the “x” factor could have been “minus something” because of efficiency, but the greater part of
this is something to do with excess profit levels that were initially allowed, and are now being
taken away by effective regulatory action.
If you ask me, “has this really meant a really large change in their profits”, the answer is “No”.
Their profits have now stabilised.  They started rising very fast and after 1997 they have now
stabilised, which suggests that it was actually a perfectly economically rational decision, even
though it appeared like a kind of revenge at the time.   One of the very interesting phenomena in
England is that the regulator, of course, had never regulated before.  It was a new activity.  But
the new companies which were immediately quite commercial were also very smart. I think it is
fair to say very crudely that, for the first five years, the companies outsmarted the regulator and,
since about 1995, the regulator has been getting his own back.  It has taken about five or six years
for the regulator to learn enough about the way in which the companies financially manipulate
their negotiations with him, for him to get some control over the industry.  So the price
determinations that have taken place since 1995 have been quite stringent and relatively difficult
for the companies.  They have not gone bankrupt, they are still quite happy.  They are making a
normal level of return but they were previously making a very high level of return, in a very low-
risk industry, in transmission and distribution and that was clearly not an acceptable long-term
position.
II.3 THE GEOGRAPHY OF VERTICAL DE-INTEGRATION AND INTEGRATION
One of the things I always like to say in meetings of this kind is that, the British government
seems to have a belief that economic theory changes, as you move North from England to
Scotland.  South of the English-Scottish border, economic theory says that you pursue economic
efficiency best in the electricity industry by vertical separation, preferably into four completely
separate activities: generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply –that is something I am
sure is not unfamiliar to you.
We have in England and Wales emphasised very much, in recent years, the separateness of
supply, essentially the commercial activity in electricity where you buy electricity in bulk and
then you sell it.  It has a trading function; it has nothing to do with the physical business of
generating or transmitting electricity.  Economic theory in England says -where possible- each of
these four stages should be vertically separated.  Economic theory in Scotland seems to say, on
the contrary, you should actually combine them all together.  When we did our privatisation in13
1990, in England we put an enormous amount of effort into separating these four stages and, in
Scotland, we said, no, there is no point, let us just keep everything vertically integrated.
The problem that the Conservative Government faced at the time of privatisation was not to upset
the Scottish political system. I do not make any apology for showing the interactions between the
politics and the economics of this industry, because they have always been very tight and very
close -I think- probably everywhere, and certainly for us. Not only was Scottish nationalism very
important but so was support for relatively traditional social democratic politics, represented by
the Labour party.  Support for free market capitalism was much smaller in Scotland than it was in
England.  There were already two politically quite popular vertically-integrated utilities in
Scotland, and the political calculation was –that if they got broken up- it would be politically,
enormously unpopular.  To give you another example from another industry, when we privatised
the water industry in Britain, we privatised it in England but we left it in public hands in
Scotland, because of the fear of the Scottish political reaction. Or, putting it crudely, people were
even less likely to vote Conservative, if the same changes took place in Scotland as took place in
England, and so they did not privatise it in the North. There were some technical reasons as well.
Scotland is a smaller system; it had more nuclear power in it, but it would not have been a big
problem to treat it the same as England if the politics had allowed us to do so.  For that reason we
did not.
Finally, I have to mention that we have a completely different model in Northern Ireland.
Northern Ireland is a very complicated place for a variety of reasons. It has no physical electricity
connection –yet, it will have- to Scotland or to England, and it operates another completely
separate model. We are trying very hard to wean it away from the single buyer because when we
are negotiating in Brussels and we say we want an open market, the French say, “what about
Northern Ireland?”  And we say, “well, that is a bit embarrassing”.  I could talk more about
Northern Ireland but it is only a market of one million people and it is completely geographically
separate, subject to the very difficult politics of Northern Ireland.  I would prefer not to deal with
it at any great length but it is an embarrassment -I accept that that is true.  To a significant extent,
the experience of Scotland is an embarrassment to those who argue that it is very important to
vertically separate these four stages.
We were relatively successful in the early years of privatisation in England and Wales in getting
vertical de-integration.  We certainly created immediately a separate transmission company: the
National Grid Company which neither buys nor sells electricity, it simply makes a charge for the
use of the transmission system and the charge is public and it is regulated, and it is universal.
There has been confidence for some years on the part, both of potential generators and
consumers, that they will not, in any way, be blocked from whatever commercial transactions
they wish to make because of any difficulties in the transmission system.  The transmission
system has worked very well as a vertically separated entity.  Nobody seriously suggests re-
integrating transmission with the rest of the system.
II.4 FREE (THOUGH COSTLY) CHOICE OF SUPPLIER14
Anyhow, we did not vertically de-integrate completely.  We kept distribution and supply
together, partly of course, because it always had been together.  In other words, the local
companies which owned the wires and had traditionally done all the retailing as well, continued
to do so, at least at first.
In three stages, we have separated distribution and supply, if not quite institutionally, then at
least, in principle.  First of all, from 1990, we allowed customers of 1-Mw maximum demand to
have a free choice of supply. Later, in 1994, we allowed customers with a 100-Kw maximum
demand to have a free choice of supply, and by then that was about 50% of all electricity sales in
kilowatt/hour terms.  Recently, in1998, ending in May of this year –only two months ago- we
opened up the entire market to free choice of supplier, so every consumer now in England, Wales
and Scotland –for that matter, 23 million consumers in all-  can choose who sends them their bill.
They may make savings, to some extent or other, by choosing to switch away from the host
distribution company which traditionally had the monopoly franchise of retail sales and into some
other supplier.
I should also mention that it has also been extremely expensive to open up a market to household
supply competition.  To develop the new software and data transfer systems that are necessary to
allow all 23 million consumers to switch supply, if they wish, has already cost over one billion
dollars.  The regulator has made an announcement with which I personally am not in agreement,
that over 95% of this cost is legitimately chargeable to consumers.  Over the next five years, the
consumers who are supposed to benefit from this new market –who may in some cases benefit
from it to some significant extent- will all certainly have to pay more than a billion dollars in
order to have the system set up.  It is likely that richer consumers will make significant net gains
over five years, even after they have paid for the billion dollars.  It is also possible that some
poorer consumers will make no net gains at all, in which case the question is raised politically:
was it worthwhile, in the first place?
Coming back to the issue of integration, we have separated distribution and supply, but until now,
in the regulatory process, we have issued a single license to the distribution companies, covering
both distribution and supply.  We also have available separate licenses for retail supply to other
suppliers who want to compete, but the distribution companies have been licensed jointly.  We
are just reaching a point now where, starting from next year, the distribution companies which
will still be doing distribution, of course, and will also be prominent in retail supply,  will have to
have separate licenses for the two businesses, but they will still be allowed to conduct the two
businesses, in a sense, in parallel.  They will not have to have physical separation of their
businesses.  They will be able to continue to work as they now do.
II.5 LIMITED AND CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION-DRIVEN RE-INTEGRATION
There is a real issue in the British regulatory system: whether or not there should not be further
separation; whether, even if we allow the same companies to do distribution and retail supply,
under the same ownership,  we should require the companies to become physically separate and
not have them united within the same company headquarters or company organisation.  We have
not really decided that yet.  What has been more important in terms of vertical integration, has15
been the very strong desire, of the generating part of the industry and the distribution part of the
industry, to re-integrate as much as they can.  They will re-integrate, of course, not fully, if we
have generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply.  We are clearly going to keep
transmission entirely separate and everyone is going to have access to that, but the generators
have wanted to get hold of distribution and supply, and the distribution companies have wanted
to get hold of as much generation as possible.  A very large part of the regulatory problem that
we have experienced in England and Wales has been various regulatory attempts to stop the
distributors getting hold of too much generation, and stopping the generators getting hold of any
distribution or supply.
In the initial settlement of privatisation, we had the very unfortunate result, very well publicised,
very well-known, that we had only two dominant fossil fuel generators and we had twelve
distribution companies.  It was perfectly clear that these two generating companies, because they
had just been split from one large State organisation, also had intimate knowledge of each other.
Most of the people who had worked for the State Corporation –the CEGB- moved into National
Power or PowerGen.  The amount of detailed cost and technical information available to each
company about the operations of the other was enormous because, essentially, they were all the
same people.  It was, therefore, extremely easy for these two generators to operate in a collusive
manner, without any very explicit arrangements between them.  It is common place and true, that
the two generators have acted very collusively in the wholesale market, and the wholesale market
has been, in some ways, quite unsuccessful, in the sense that the price determined in the
wholesale market has been very high,  which has been a persistent theme of our system for the
last nine years.    Let me just give you a simple example in economic terms of why it is perfectly
plain that our wholesale electricity price is too high; it also helps to explain the popularity of new
investment.
In the last few years the average price determined in our electricity pool has been, in English
currency terms, round about 2.5 pence per Kw/hour; sometimes it has gone to about 2.7,
sometimes it has been around 2.3 but that has been roughly speaking, the average wholesale
price. If you ask the question: what is the full cost of new entry into this industry as a generator?
The answer is that it has been falling, but the full cost of new entry is now about 2 pence the
Kw/h.  You would normally expect, in any reasonably competitive market, that the new entry
price ought to be an upper limit to the wholesale price and it clearly has not been.  Because it has
not been, these 2 pence per Kw/hour will reward any new investor with a reasonably good rate of
return. If you can be paid round about 2.5 pence the Kw/h, you are then getting up to a real rate
of return of 20% and more,  so it is no great surprise to discover that, although we had a very
large surplus of generating capacity when we privatised our industry, and although we then
introduced more commercial risk to the investment decision, the answer was not that nobody
wanted to invest, the answer was absolutely everybody wanted to invest, and we have now had,
roughly speaking, 20Gw of new capacity installed in the last 10 years.  That represents about one
third of the size of the entire system, on top of a pre-existing surplus of capacity of a maximum
demand.  The principal explanation for the popularity of this new investment has been the
inadequate competition in the generation market, keeping the level of wholesale prices well
above the entry level for new investment, and thereby encouraging, almost certainly,  an
excessive level of new investment.16
Let me come back to the story about vertical re-integration.  Because we have been so worried
about the power of the generating companies to keep up wholesale prices to levels above what we
would expect in a competitive market,  the one thing that we have been very keen to do –the
regulator has been very keen to do- is to avoid allowing the generators to have any contact at all
with distribution or supply companies.  On the other hand, because the distribution companies
have had such relatively poor bargaining power in the market, there has been a lot of allowance
for the distribution companies to go into their own generation.  The most enthusiastic participants
of all, in this investment process which has yielded about 20 Gw, have been the distribution
companies.  Something like 10 Gw of new plant is now, at least partly, owned by the distribution
companies and they allow themselves, as well as owning these plants, to sign power purchase
agreements to take back the electricity from them.  They very foolishly signed power purchase
agreements over 15 years, both for quantity and for price.  Fifteen years for quantity would have
probably been okay, but they also fixed the prices at about 2.7 to 2.9 pence the Kw/h.  Because
they can now buy out of the pool at about 2.5 pence the Kw/h,  the distribution companies are
landed with essentially stranded contracts, at these really rather high prices which they were
nevertheless willing to pay in the early 1990s, as a way of gaining some leverage over the major
generating companies and of having some control over their own generation.  Therefore, we
began to allow some vertical re-integration to help the distribution companies counteract the
power of the generators.  The generators, however, continue to want to acquire distribution and
supply companies.
II.6 REDUCING THE MARKET POWER OF DOMINANT GENERATORS THROUGH DIVESTITURE AND
BY ALLOWING LIMITED RE-INTEGRATION
The question is really, why shouldn’t they?  Provided the transmission system is kept opened to
access and available to everyone, why should the generators not acquire distribution and supply?
I think the answer to it is not that it is inherently undesirable to have a generating company
owning distribution and supply.  It might be undesirable to have it owning distribution, but now
that we are separating off the licenses for distribution and supply, it is not clear why generators
should not own electricity supply, should not be electricity retailers. The answer that I, at least,
give to why we have not been willing to let them acquire distribution or supply, is simply that
they already have too much market power.  To allow them to own any other facilities in the
industry, gives them even more market power.
What the regulator has been doing, and relatively successfully, as a way of trying to stop the
generators from having too much market power, has been doing various kinds of bargaining deals
that partly involve connections, alliances, with other parts of our regulatory system. It is
important here to say that we have, in Britain, a quite long-established organisation which we
used to call the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.  It has been recently renamed the
Competition Commission and has been given slightly enhanced powers under a new Competition
Act which is, first of all, a well-respected institution and also one given quite a deal of power.
There are a whole series of pieces of competition legislation that have evolved over the last thirty
years.17
Our electricity, gas, water and telecommunications Regulators would not have had as much
success as they have in regulating their industries, had they not had available to them, the
possibility of making alliances with these central, economy-wide pro-competition anti-monopoly
regulators.
In the first instance, when the regulator wanted to reduce the market power of the generators in
1994, he made them a threat -as they say in the film “The Godfather”, he made them an offer they
could not refuse-. He said to them:  “I have no power to make you sell off any of your plants and
I have no power to make you reduce the pool price, because the legislation says that generation is
a competitive activity.  On the other hand, both of you have a share in the electricity market,
above 25%, and our General Competition legislation in Britain says that if you have more than
25% market share and if I, as your regulator,  have grounds for thinking you are behaving anti-
competitively, I can make a reference of you to this Commission, and the worst thing that they
might do is to recommend that you be broken up.  Now, would you like to risk being broken up
or would you like to sell 6000 Mw of plant and freeze the pool price?”. And they said, “actually
we would rather sell the plant and we will freeze the pool price because we do not want to go to
the Competition Regulator who might produce an even worse result”.  One of the ways in which
we successfully reduced the market power of the generators was by threatening them with the
wider regulatory system.  They preferred to do what the electricity regulator wanted, even though
he legally had no power to insist upon it, and they divested 6000 Mw of plant and they froze the
pool price for two years.
We then reached a situation –much more recently in 1998- where we still thought the generators
had too much market power.  The pool price was still about the new entry price and the regulator
again wanted to persuade the generators to sell more plant and reduce their market share yet
again. There was no constitutional power to do so, but this time the deal was to do with vertical
re-integration.  Essentially the deal this time round was that both generating companies were
required –asked- to sell 4000 Mw of plant each -another 4000 Mw each- in return for which they
would be allowed to buy one -but only one- distribution and supply company.  That is, in fact, the
solution that we now have.  We have allowed a small amount of vertical re-integration from
generation through to distribution and supply, but only in return for the generators giving up
more of their capacity.  We will reach a point, I think, within the next two or three years, where
this market power that the generators have had over the wholesale price will finally be broken.
Because once these two companies have sold off a further 4000 Mw of plant, both of them will
have a market share of well under 20%.  There will then be at least five companies, each of which
will make bids into our electricity pool.  That should reduce the amount of market power they
have and help the pool price to reduce itself to something close to the new entry level.
My own view is that, if we solve the problem of market power on the side of the generators, I
would have no great objection to generating companies being involved in retail supply.  I would
not really want them to own distribution companies because that is a natural monopoly part of the
industry.  I think our long-term results in England will almost certainly be to permit generating
companies to own retail supply companies, provided we can guarantee open access to the
transmission and distribution network, and provided we can guarantee that no one company will
have a dominant market position,  whether through generation alone, or through integrating
generation and retail supply.  My own expectation is that we will allow that kind of integration18
between the two essentially competitive elements of the industry, provided that we can keep
entirely separate the issue of the transmission and distribution network.
II.7 GIVING UP THE “POOL”
We are about to abandon our pool. As you may know we have a compulsory pool for electricity.
Everybody who has a generating set of 100 Mw or more must make a bid, every day, up to 48
half hours for the following day, a price bid at which they will offer to run their generating set.
Only if their price bid is accepted by the transmission company, which at present is both the
system operator and the market operator –that is something that will change as well- only then
will that generating set actually run.  Because of the way in which we pay generators, is that
everyone gets paid the system marginal price, or some supplement to that, depending upon other
technicalities, but you do not get paid as bid, you get paid according to the marginal price.  It
means that if you have a very compelling reason to run your generating set, which might be
because it is nuclear and you cannot make nuclear run up and down very quickly, or it might be
for a contractual reason -you have an independent power project which is contracted to run all the
time it is available-  then you simply bid zero.  If you bid zero, then your bid is inevitably
accepted, but you get paid at the system marginal price.  You may then have another contract,
which might be a year or it might be fifteen years, which to some extent supersedes the pool price
as well.  So there are various forms of financial cover.  That is the basis of our current system.
We are now proposing to move to a model that is very close to that of Norway.  It happens to be
the case that most electricity traded at the wholesale level in England now is subject to bilateral
contract, something like 80%, maybe a little bit more, of all electricity traded, is a bilateral
contract between a generator and usually a distribution company.  It will usually be a one-year
contract.  It will be a hedging contract, a contract for difference, which will even out variations in
the pool price, lead to a steady flow of cost for the distribution company and avoid the risks of
fluctuations and high Winter prices, and so on and so forth.  There will no longer be a reference
pool price in our new system because there will not be a pool.  We shall have to have other price
disclosure mechanisms, which hopefully will work reasonably well.   That same 80% of
electricity will probably continue to be traded essentially in much the same way as it is now by
bilateral contract.
The difference will appear when we come to short-term, daily, spot markets and, of course, we
will no longer have central dispatch.  Currently we have central dispatch, but will now have
essentially self-dispatch.  We will run a market –or so we propose- 24 hours before each trading
period.  It shall be a multilateral market, not a bilateral market.  It will probably be a screen-based
market and it will allow the demand-side to bid much more actively than is currently the case.
Then we will run a market four hours before each trading period, which will be almost identical
to the Norwegian or Nordic model, a balancing market in which the system operator will check
whether the previous power exchange period has or has not physically balanced the system.
Then, they will be the counterpart to every trade and their job for the last four hours will be to
call up generating contract parties or to call on large consumers to load-manage, in order to
physically balance the market each day,  which is a fairly large change from our existing system.19
I have already been asked the question on what difference this will possibly make.  What is
wrong with the existing system?  What is wrong with the existing system -I think- is not so much
that it is technically a bad form of market.  What is wrong with the existing system is that it has
been dominated by the generators because they have market power, not necessarily inherent in
the pool system.  The political conviction of the Labour Government has been that, if the market
is reorganised in this way, it will induce the generators to burn less gas and to burn more coal.
The labour government has a residual affection for the coal mining industry and is trying to
support a slower rate of decline than would otherwise had been the case.  I myself do not believe
it will really make a lot of difference to the amount of coal that is burnt and the amount of gas
that is consumed.  But it is politically very important that we make the change, because the
government has made a condition of allowing people to invest again in gas-fired generation.
At present, there is a temporary moratorium on the government approving new generation of a
gas-fired type.  A condition of resuming the approval for new generation for gas-firing is that this
new market be established.  Most of the people in that market would like to either build or buy
from new gas-fired generation, so they have a very powerful impulse to make this new market
work, because only when it works will the government start allowing them to invest in new gas-
fired generation again.  It is essentially entirely a politically-driven change in the market.  I do not
think it will make the market much worse, I am not clear whether it will make it much better, and
it is certainly costing people quite a lot of time and effort. It is not a billion dollars worth, but it is
tens of millions of dollars worth.  And, in the end, it is a very political change. It is, incidentally,
something of an embarrassment to the British consulting industry which has gone around the
world telling people that the English pool is a great thing, when now it is the case that the English
pool is being abandoned because –at least politically-  it has been deemed to be a bad thing and
that we need something closer to the Norwegian model.
Officially, the changes should be implemented by April of next year.  In practice, it is taking a lot
of time.  There is an attempt for voluntary agreement in all parties in the market –and of course,
all parties do not always find it easy to agree. The current estimate is September of next year, but
there is also the suggestion that there might be an election in the Spring of 2002.  If there are any
residual doubts at all that the new market might lead to any perturbation, any possibility of price
increases or black-outs or something politically unpleasant, it is now thought this may just be
postponed for another six months, but it cannot start before September 2001.  It may not start
until the Spring of the year 2002, sort of April 2002.  There is a very intensive process of
negotiation currently going on between the generators and the distributors and the National Grid
Company.  One of the things we will do that is probably useful is we will not have the National
Grid Company both as the system operator and the market operator.  The National Grid
Company, the transmission company, will remain the system operator but we shall have new
actors as market operators.  People who will run the power exchange will be somebody different.
II.8 REGULATION AND LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS
As I said earlier on, over a period of eight or nine years, we have slowly been opening the retail
supply market to competition.  We planned, in April 1998, at one moment, to let all 23 million
consumers have a free choice.  In fact, there were very large technical problems.  The technical20
problems were also motivated, to some extent, on the part of the distribution companies, by a
desire not to let the gas company compete in their markets, in the same way as they were now
allowed to compete in gas markets. The upshot was that, instead of introducing competition fully,
in April 1998, we only started it in September of last year and we only completed it in May of
this year, so that most consumers have only had four or five months of free choice of supplier,
unlike the gas industry.  Remember that in Britain almost 90% of all households directly
consume natural gas –and most of them use it for heating- so most people’s gas bills are about as
big as their electricity bills in England, because electricity is not usually a heating fuel,  it is gas
that is the heating fuel, so both are important in the domestic market.  So it took a very long time
to introduce the above.
All the evidence that we have so far suggests -both in the gas market, which is also open, and the
electricity market-, as you would expect from economic theory, that we are unpicking the cross-
subsidies that previously existed within the domestic market, so that those consumers who are
relatively wealthy, have high consumption, live in urban areas,  have a bank account and are
willing to pay on a monthly basis by a direct debit, are being offered extremely low prices.
Those consumers who are relatively poor, have low consumption, live in rural areas and
sometimes do not pay their bills on time, are being offered extremely poor deals.  Well, you
would expect that because the former category is very cheap to supply and are good customers
from the point of view of the companies.  The latter are expensive to supply and are bad
customers from the perspective of the utilities.  We have already got evidence from the gas
market, that the difference in the price per therm –the unit we use in Britain for gas- is as much as
20% within the same area,  between the tariff being charged to the best customers and the tariff
being charged to the worst customers.  One of the issues that our political system is just
beginning to address - and it is already happening in electricity though to a lesser extent, because
the total savings available to consumers in electricity happen to be smaller, for other reasons-  is
that essentially poorer people are now beginning to be charged more per unit for their electricity
and gas than richer people.
It is the traditional answer of most economists that you should, wherever possible, deal with
poverty through income supplementation of one kind or another, not through directly subsidising
prices.  We have had a quite strong tradition for some years in Britain not to interfere in
individual markets, at the consumer level, to subsidise prices, with very minor exceptions.  In
cold weather, the State will make extra payments to old people, to encourage them to keep warm
enough.  We have a very high rate of excess winter deaths in Britain from hypothermia.  Several
tens of thousands.  Much worse than any other European country.  There has been half-hearted
political commitment –some political commitment- to try and reverse that by making extra
payments to old people in Winter.  It is possible to imagine that something like that might be
extended –direct income supplements- to help poor people overcome these effects, but it is also
true that the British treasury is deeply opposed to such things.  The British treasury is very
powerful –as you probably know-  in British economic and political life, and the British treasury
will be strongly arguing for the electricity industry and the electricity regulatory system to sort
out the problem for itself.  In other words, almost certainly there will be a duty on the regulator,
in some way, to intervene in the way in which prices are set for poorer consumers rather than
some form of income subsidy.   I have to say we have not really tested that to any large extent
yet. My guess would be that the pressure will be on the electricity system and the regulator, to21
find some not necessarily economically very efficient solution but one that will be socially more
acceptable than continuing to have richer consumers paying less than poorer consumers.
In gas, we are finding in the area of the Southwest of England -where we first introduced gas
competition for private consumers- that fixed charges are very small.  They are not very
significant and have been reduced in recent years, not for any economically very rational reason,
but because people marketing electricity and gas discovered that consumers would rather pay
more per Kw/h and have a smaller fixed charge,  so the fixed charges are beginning to disappear
as part of the competitive process. The main issue is:  what is the cost per energy unit delivered?
In the Southwest of England, between the worst tariff offered to someone who was in a pre-
payment system and the best tariff being offered by another company to someone who was a
direct debit customer, was 36% per unit of energy delivered.  You have to remember that in
Britain -where as you know if you have visited Britain, we have a rather long, cold and
unpleasant Winter- the majority of the gas bill in this case is for heating.  On the whole, poor
people live in less well-insulated houses, with less efficient heating systems and actually
purchase physically more energy than rich people, in absolute terms.  Even rich people who live
in quite large houses, with efficient heating systems, and good insulation properties, will
absolutely use less physical energy than poor people.  The political problem arises because the
poor already buy more energy, in absolute terms, although their incomes are less.  If they then
start paying 20% more per unit of energy, then the poor person’s energy bill may well be double
that of the rich person’s, and they might have four times lower income.  That begins to be
politically quite difficult to sustain and is an important additional factor.
On the other hand, it is true that a regulatory condition for every competitor in the supply market
is that they must offer to supply everybody with a net market.  You cannot in any way cherry-
pick and say that I will choose to supply you but I refuse to offer you any terms at all.  Of course,
it does not mean that you have to offer the same terms or equally good terms to different
categories of consumers.  You can choose.  On average, it is still true that pre-payment customers
are being offered significantly worse terms than those who have either credit or direct debit
tariffs.  It is also true that some are being offered reasonably good discounts in some cases.  I
think there are two possible kinds of explanations: one is that pre-payment consumers are already
paying somewhat more per Kw/h than other consumers, and that may sometimes reflect an excess
over costs, in other words, they may be paying too much at the moment, relative to cost, so that it
is possible to discount relatively easily and secondly –I think-  some companies are trying very
hard to show that they are treating all consumers well and are hoping to get some goodwill from
the notion that they will treat pre-payment consumers relatively well.  Anyhow, it remains true
that in the market as a whole, pre-payment customers are being made offers that are much worse
than those who do not have pre-payment meters.
Pre-payment customers are about 15% of all customers.  Only about half of them are definitely
poor customers.  Some just choose pre-payment for other reasons and there are quite a lot of poor
customers who are not pre-payment.  Generally speaking, we can use pre-payment as a kind of
proxy or index of poverty and, on the whole, they are not being given offers that are quite so
good.  In terms of why the discounts are better than people expected, I think part of it is, that a
number of companies who are very keen to establish their market position,  are willing to accept
a zero margin or possibly some loss in the early years, in order to establish a large market share.
The most prominent example of that is the off-shoot of British Gas, the company called Centrica.22
Centrica is the major supplier of gas to the domestic market and for most of the last couple of
years, the electricity companies have been selling gas in their home market.  Now, a couple of
years later, Centrica is being allowed to sell electricity in the home market of the electricity
companies.  It is putting a huge effort into gaining electricity customers and, in roughly the first
six months of the new competitive market, Centrica have signed up one million electricity
consumers.  Their target for the first five years is now to sign up four million, which will be
almost 20% of the entire electricity market by a new entrant.  There will be only large new
entrants.  They are proposing quite a good deal in which they offer at least 12% reduction in
electricity tariffs, and they promise that the electricity tariff, if you buy from them, will be less
than your host distribution company, at least until the year 2001.  Whatever tariff your host
distribution company offers, Centrica say “we will charge you less”. Mind you, since the
regulator will stop free pricing by the host distribution company, the risk is not that great.  If you
ask me “can Centrica make money out of that level of discount?  I must say “I do not remotely
believe it can” but if you said to me “once it has four million consumers, will it make money over
the next ten years? I would say, yes, almost certainly.   I think there is a certain amount of loss
leading going on, by those relatively few companies that really want to establish a large market
share.
Overall and just by a way of conclusion, all of that may or may not be a good thing, socially and
politically. There are very strong signs in our system that it is not going to be politically
acceptable for long.  The new Labour Government has given itself powers every five years to
issue explicit instructions to our economic regulators for electricity and gas –they have actually
now been merged into one office- to take account of specific social and environmental priorities.
Almost certainly within –I would guess about a year-  one of the first Acts that will be undertaken
under this new utility regulation law will be to instruct the regulator to take such action, so as to
ensure that relatively poor consumers do not systematically pay a lot more for their electricity or
their gas, than richer consumers.  That, of course, will interfere with the operation of the market.
The market will not operate as well or as easily as if it were unrestricted but, nevertheless, it
seems to me extremely likely to happen.  And, by the way, it seems to me that we do have a
serious dilemma here.
If you go back to my first theme about Europe more widely, if we open up an electricity market
to competition only for large consumers, we run the general risk that all smaller consumers will
be penalised. There will be a general cross-subsidy in favour of industrial consumers and against
smaller consumers.  Then we say, no, we must not stop with just industrial markets, we must
open it up to the entire consumer market and then we avoid that problem.  The answer is that we
do, but then we make a fresh discrimination between relatively richer and better paying
consumers and relatively poorer and less well-paying consumers.  Then you have to ask the
question, will your regulatory system be able to operate entirely according to the principles of
economic efficiency, or will you have to modify it significantly because there are equity or social
considerations, which might require you to override that particular market pressure. We are not
quite yet at that point within Britain, but my guess is that in about a year we shall have to face it.
Under Conservative governments, our regulatory system has been very dominated by economic
efficiency, and it has had the presumption that, in all possible ways, economic efficiency is best
promoted by more competition, which arguably in most circumstances, it is.  Because of these
changes and because we have had a change in the political complexion of our government -quite
a small change, I would not say we have had a radical change of government, politically-23
nevertheless, it is a government which has slightly more interest in questions of poverty than the
previous one.  It is quite likely that we will now have to change our regulatory system in some
way, to get away from the purity of economic efficiency as the only operating criterion for our
system, and to moderate that with some considerations of equity.   I suspect that will happen quite
soon.24
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